Výsledky hledání

typ: rozbor× v celém archivu zrušit filtry

308 karet z 310 položek · strana 4 z 6 CZ · EN/orig

1

Detecting cloud ransomware in Azure with Tenable One’s cloud detection and response capabilities

Learn how Tenable One Cloud Exposure helps you unmask the sophisticated tactics of cybercrime group Storm-0501, which carries out Azure-based cloud ransomware campaigns. Tenable One Cloud Exposure uses AI-powered threat stories to expose Storm-0501 TTPs, backed by precision-engineered threat detection alerts.Key takeawaysStorm-0501 demonstrates that cloud-first ransomware groups have shifted from simple endpoint encryption to the total hijacking of cloud tenants.Storm-0501 systematically…

Microsoft US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: ransomware tp: identita

· Tenable Research · Detecting cloud ransomware in Azure with Tenable One’s cloud detection and response capabilities

1

The Agentic AI threat cluster: Seven incidents, three actors, and what they mean for your exposure

Tenable’s Research Special Operations (RSO) team has been tracking a cluster of agentic AI threat activity since late July 2026. The Taiwan autonomous AI cyber attack confirmed what the cluster data already showed: near-autonomous offensive AI has crossed from theoretical risk to operational reality.Key TakeawaysTaiwan's Ministry of Digital Affairs confirmed a near-autonomous AI cyber attack in July 2026 in which autonomous agents mapped 21 connected government systems, compromised 85 accounts,…

KEV ✓ · ransomware EPSS 1.00 CVE-2025-3248 GitBook veřejná správa energetika US

tg: incident tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: únik dat tp: AI tp: identita tp: špionáž

· Tenable Research · The Agentic AI threat cluster: Seven incidents, three actors, and what they mean for your exposure

1

SPOJENO PŘES CVE Upozorňujeme na řetězec kritických zranitelností „wp2shell“ ve WordPress

Upozorňujeme na dvojici zranitelností ve WordPress Core označovaných jako wp2shell (CVE-2026-63030 a CVE-2026-60137), které mohou při kombinovaném zneužití vést ke vzdálenému spuštění kódu (RCE) bez nutnosti přihlášení.

KEV ✓ EPSS 0.97 CVSS 9.0 CVE-2026-60137 CVE-2026-63030 WordPress CZ US AT FR

tg: zneužíváno tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: přehled tp: malware tp: ransomware

· NÚKIB · Upozorňujeme na řetězec kritických zranitelností „wp2shell“ ve WordPress · Cisco Talos · Don’t swing at everything · Elastic Security · wp2shell hits WordPress: detecting pre-auth RCE from plugin drop to command execution · CERT.at · Kritische Sicherheitslücken in WordPress - Updates verfügbar · CERT-FR – alerty · Multiples vulnérabilités dans WordPress (20 juillet 2026)

3

The State of Ransomware Q2 2026

For the past year, the ransomware conversation has centered on concentration: a handful of dominant RaaS operations controlling most of the damage, and a shrinking pool of active groups fighting over the same territory. The State of Ransomware Q2 2026 report from Check Point Research shows that picture starting to shift. The leaders are still winning, but the road to joining them has gotten a great deal shorter. Key observed findings The ecosystem stayed concentrated even as its tail widened…

IL

tg: rozbor tp: ransomware tp: AI

· Check Point Research · The State of Ransomware Q2 2026

New Android malware lets criminals use your bank card in real time

Researchers at Group-IB have discovered a new NFC relay malware family, purpose-built to capture live card data via NFC and forward it in real time to attackers. They dubbed it “WindRelay.” NFC (Near Field Communication) is wireless technology that allows devices such as smartphones, payment cards, and payment terminals to communicate when they’re very close together. So, instead of stealing your physical bank card, the attackers capture NFC activity on an infected mobile phone and relay it in…

Google finance US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: podvod

· Malwarebytes Labs · New Android malware lets criminals use your bank card in real time

Dissecting the JWR phishing framework

Cisco Talos recently identified an undocumented phishing framework, internally branded "JWR" by its developer, built to convincingly impersonate checkout and login pages across major payment and shopping platforms. The client engine of the JWR phishing framework is a real-time, operator-driven system that, rather than merely logging form submissions like a static credential-stealing page, keeps an AES-CTR encrypted WebSocket open to the threat actor so they can steer each victim's session live.…

Shopify PayPal Apple Klarna US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: phishing tp: podvod tp: identita

· Cisco Talos · Dissecting the JWR phishing framework

1

AI is Working in the SOC. So Why are Security Executives More Worried Than Ever?

Something shifted in security operations over the last two years: AI stopped being a pilot program and became the plan.And if you survey 500 security professionals on whether that's going well – as Omdia did, commissioned by Rapid7 – you get a remarkable level of consensus: 97% report positive outcomes, 98% say AI reduces alert fatigue, and 95% say it's helping address staffing shortages.Those numbers are high enough that the story could stop there; AI is working, everyone agrees. Move on. But…

US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Rapid7 · AI is Working in the SOC. So Why are Security Executives More Worried Than Ever?

1

13 million tool calls: auditing every AI coding agent action with Elastic Agent

We gave hundreds of developers an AI agent that can run shell commands, edit files, and call Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers on their laptops, then realized we had no record of what it actually did. So we built one. One 280-line dependency-free bash script, fired by Cursor's hooks, records every tool call as JSONL, and the Elastic Agent already on each endpoint ships it to Elasticsearch. Since the May rollout we have logged over 13 million tool-call events from more than 1,100 machines. A…

Cursor Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · 13 million tool calls: auditing every AI coding agent action with Elastic Agent

3

DeadLock ransomware: Breaking down a Rust-based encryptor with decentralized recovery infrastructure

In this article Pre-encryptionEncryptionPost-encryptionDefending against DeadLock ransomwareIndicators of compromise Microsoft Threat Intelligence tracks DeadLock ransomware as an emerging financially motivated operation distinguished by its use of decentralized infrastructure to support victim communications and data leak operations. Its recovery ecosystem combines the Session messaging network with blockchain-backed services that store and deliver resources used throughout the extortion…

doprava výroba a průmysl US

tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: ransomware

· Microsoft Security Blog · DeadLock ransomware: Breaking down a Rust-based encryptor with decentralized recovery infrastructure

Audit Fix: Audit Readiness for the Post-Mythos Era

Key Takeaways Human-speed compliance is dead. Attackers utilizing modern, autonomous AI tools can chain enterprise misconfigurations and weaponize vulnerabilities in under 25 minutes, rendering manual, periodic audit cycles completely obsolete. The “Configuration Gap” is your biggest blind spot. Organizations take an average of 14 months to remediate basic identity, access control, and logging flaws, leaving a massive, open window of exposure for automated exploitation. Hyper-prioritization is…

Qualys US

tg: rozbor tg: novinka v produktu tg: propagace tp: AI tp: identita

· Qualys · Audit Fix: Audit Readiness for the Post-Mythos Era

1

Living off the coding agent: Two tales of tunnels and LaunchAgents

Coding agents such as Claude Code and Cursor are vendor-signed, used all day on developer laptops, and routinely open shells, call APIs, edit files, and install helpers. That makes GenAI-adjacent alerts challenging to investigate. The parent looks trusted, while the children can still look a lot like classic high-severity activity. This article walks through one of those windows. On a macOS endpoint, Elastic Security endpoint telemetry showed shells under Claude Code that scripted a login to an…

Apple US

tg: rozbor tp: AI tp: identita

· Elastic Security · Living off the coding agent: Two tales of tunnels and LaunchAgents

4

Agentic AI for cyber defenders: What security teams built at Black Hat USA 2026

Agentic AI armed attackers first, but it also put real building power in defenders’ hands. Here’s what security practitioners built in two days at Black Hat USA 2026, and how the CyberAgents Exchange keeps that work compounding long after the event.Key takeawaysBuilding defensive cybersecurity tooling no longer requires a developer. Agentic tooling drove the cost of finding and exploiting a vulnerability down to 1990s levels; it also removed the engineering barrier that kept defenders from…

Tenable US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Tenable Research · Agentic AI for cyber defenders: What security teams built at Black Hat USA 2026

Living off the coding agent: Two tales of tunnels and LaunchAgents

Coding agents such as Claude Code and Cursor are vendor-signed, used all day on developer laptops, and routinely open shells, call APIs, edit files, and install helpers. That makes GenAI-adjacent alerts challenging to investigate. The parent looks trusted, while the children can still look a lot like classic high-severity activity. This article walks through one of those windows. On a macOS endpoint, Elastic Security endpoint telemetry showed shells under Claude Code that scripted a login to an…

Cursor Apple Cloudflare US

tg: rozbor tp: AI tp: identita

· Elastic Security · Living off the coding agent: Two tales of tunnels and LaunchAgents

The security signal log tailing can't see: tracking npm cooldown removals with Elastic Agent

npm's min-release-age setting tells npm to ignore any package version published less than a set number of days ago, keeping freshly compromised releases out of npm install during the window when they do the most damage. Getting the setting onto developer workstations is straightforward. Knowing when someone quietly deletes it is a different problem entirely, and log-tailing inputs are no help because they only fire when lines are appended to a file. We built a ~40-line Common Expression…

Elastic npm US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: dodavatelský řetězec

· Elastic Security · The security signal log tailing can't see: tracking npm cooldown removals with Elastic Agent

3

AI code security with Claude Mythos Preview: Inside Tenable’s 500+ hours of testing for Project Glasswing

We spent 500+ hours and 40 billion tokens testing Anthropic’s Claude Mythos Preview for Project Glasswing. The takeaway: frontier AI won't run your code security program, but used well, it can make one even stronger.Key takeawaysFrontier AI dramatically scales security testing. In one month, Tenable dedicated 11 security experts and more than 40 billion tokens testing Claude Mythos Preview across source code analysis, exploit creation, binary reverse engineering, threat modeling, and dynamic…

Anthropic US

tg: rozbor tp: AI

· Tenable Research · AI code security with Claude Mythos Preview: Inside Tenable’s 500+ hours of testing for Project Glasswing

Shai-Hulud strikes again: CHAINDROP worm hits 400+ npm packages

On August 4, 2026, Elastic Security Labs identified a new Shai-Hulud campaign targeting the maintainer of keyv, a widely used key-value storage library. The attackers trojanized the monorepo and embedded a self-propagating worm called CHAINDROP that uses stolen npm credentials to automatically backdoor every other package the maintainer had publish rights to. The reach of this compromise is significant: keyv alone received over 600 million downloads last month, with related packages compounding…

keyv flat-cache cacheable-request cacheable US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: dodavatelský řetězec tp: identita

· Elastic Security · Shai-Hulud strikes again: CHAINDROP worm hits 400+ npm packages

Shai-Hulud strikes again: CHAINDROP worm hits 400+ npm packages

On August 4, 2026, Elastic Security Labs identified a new Shai-Hulud campaign targeting the maintainer of keyv, a widely used key-value storage library. The attackers trojanized the monorepo and embedded a self-propagating worm called CHAINDROP that uses stolen npm credentials to automatically backdoor every other package the maintainer had publish rights to. The reach of this compromise is significant: keyv alone received over 600 million downloads last month, with related packages compounding…

keyv flat-cache cacheable-request cacheable US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: dodavatelský řetězec tp: identita

· Elastic Security · Shai-Hulud strikes again: CHAINDROP worm hits 400+ npm packages

3

From open lures to cloaked gates: How a macOS ClickFix campaign learned to hide

In this article Activity overviewHow ClickFix works Campaign overviewClickFix moved from open pages to fingerprinting gatesThe fingerprinting gateMitigation and protection guidanceIndicators of compromise (IOC)ReferencesLearn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence observed a macOS ClickFix campaign distributing infostealers, including MacSync and Atomic Stealer (AMOS), through a large cluster of look-alike domains. The campaign evolved from broadly serving ClickFix lures to using a server-side…

Apple US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing

· Microsoft Security Blog · From open lures to cloaked gates: How a macOS ClickFix campaign learned to hide

Benchmarking the Agentic SOC: How we evaluate LLMs for security workflows

An agentic SOC is only as good as the model driving it. The moment you let an LLM triage an alert, hunt across your telemetry, or author a detection rule, the question stops being "is this a smart model?" and becomes something much more specific: will it pick the right skill, call the right tool in the right order, and reach the right disposition without inventing a result it never actually checked? That is not a question a general-purpose leaderboard can answer. A model can top every public…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Benchmarking the Agentic SOC: How we evaluate LLMs for security workflows

ChainDrop supply chain compromise: Anatomy of a self-propagating worm

In this article Attack chain overviewMitigation and protection guidanceIndicators of compromise (IOC)Microsoft Defender XDR detectionsAdvanced hunting queriesLearn more Microsoft Threat Intelligence identified a large-scale npm supply chain attack affecting more than 400 packages across multiple unrelated publishers, including packages associated with major enterprise software ecosystems such as keyv, flat-cache, cache-manager, and others. The malicious releases contain a Mini Shai-Hulud…

npm US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: dodavatelský řetězec tp: identita

· Microsoft Security Blog · ChainDrop supply chain compromise: Anatomy of a self-propagating worm

5

Benchmarking the Agentic SOC: How we evaluate LLMs for security workflows

An agentic SOC is only as good as the model driving it. The moment you let an LLM triage an alert, hunt across your telemetry, or author a detection rule, the question stops being "is this a smart model?" and becomes something much more specific: will it pick the right skill, call the right tool in the right order, and reach the right disposition without inventing a result it never actually checked? That is not a question a general-purpose leaderboard can answer. A model can top every public…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Benchmarking the Agentic SOC: How we evaluate LLMs for security workflows

128 Seconds to disruption: Microsoft Defender stops ransomware at QNET 

In this article What is device isolation?Case study: QNETAttack chain overviewMITRE ATT&CK techniques observedReferencesLearn more Microsoft Defender’s attack disruption now includes device isolation, a new response action that extends autonomous protection directly to compromised endpoints. At QNET, an attacker initiated a multi-stage attack using a legitimate Windows tool on a compromised endpoint to retrieve a malicious remote payload–a classic living-off-the-land (LOL) technique that often…

Microsoft obchod US

tg: incident tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: malware tp: ransomware

· Microsoft Security Blog · 128 Seconds to disruption: Microsoft Defender stops ransomware at QNET 

Agents vs. agents: how we triage HackerOne reports for $2 each, 85% as well as a human

Large language models (LLMs) made it trivially cheap to generate vulnerability reports. In the first half of 2026 alone, our HackerOne bug bounty program received over 1,390 reports, more than the full-year totals for 2024 and 2025 combined. Every one of them still requires human attention, so we decided to put agents against agents. If AI can generate reports at near-zero cost, AI should triage them at near-zero cost, too. The system we built agrees with human security engineers 85% of the…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Agents vs. agents: how we triage HackerOne reports for $2 each, 85% as well as a human

Agents vs. agents: how we triage HackerOne reports for $2 each, 85% as well as a human

Large language models (LLMs) made it trivially cheap to generate vulnerability reports. In the first half of 2026 alone, our HackerOne bug bounty program received over 1,390 reports, more than the full-year totals for 2024 and 2025 combined. Every one of them still requires human attention, so we decided to put agents against agents. If AI can generate reports at near-zero cost, AI should triage them at near-zero cost, too. The system we built agrees with human security engineers 85% of the…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Agents vs. agents: how we triage HackerOne reports for $2 each, 85% as well as a human

2

30 days with Claude Mythos Preview: How Tenable adapted our security program, and why yours is next

Tenable spent 30 days running frontier AI models against our own code. It didn’t just find bugs — it proved they’re real, with reproducible exploits. That fundamentally changes code security from ranking potential code defects to a much higher signal focused on the findings that matter. Read on to learn how it reshaped our security team's work, what it cost, and why your program is next.Key takeaways:Now code security starts with proof, not suspicions. Frontier AI instantly builds working…

Anthropic US

tg: rozbor tp: AI

· Tenable Research · 30 days with Claude Mythos Preview: How Tenable adapted our security program, and why yours is next

3

CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard targets travelers worldwide for malware delivery and credential theft

In this article The CaptiveCrunch campaignStorm-2945 and Midnight BlizzardCaptiveCrunch tradecraft and toolingHow to protect against CaptiveCrunch activityMicrosoft Defender detections and hunting guidanceIndicators of compromise Since early May 2026, Microsoft Threat Intelligence has observed Storm-2945, a sub-cluster of Midnight Blizzard, conducting widespread but targeted traffic manipulation attacks involving hospitality sector networks served by captive portals worldwide. Despite some…

Microsoft veřejná správa US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: identita tp: špionáž

· Microsoft Security Blog · CaptiveCrunch: Midnight Blizzard targets travelers worldwide for malware delivery and credential theft

Exploring the Hugging Face Breach: mapping AI agent tactics to Elastic Defend

Hugging Face reconstructed more than 17,000 attacker events from a July 2026 intrusion driven by an autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agent. The path was familiar: untrusted dataset content abused a processing worker (file disclosure, then code execution), credential harvest, then multi-cluster lateral movement. Production Elastic Defend behavior rules and Elastic Security detection (SIEM) rules already watch those types of behaviors. This post maps each stage to detections you can enable…

Hugging Face OpenAI Elastic US

tg: incident tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: únik dat tp: AI tp: identita

· Elastic Security · Exploring the Hugging Face Breach: mapping AI agent tactics to Elastic Defend

Exploring the Hugging Face Breach: mapping AI agent tactics to Elastic Defend

Hugging Face reconstructed more than 17,000 attacker events from a July 2026 intrusion driven by an autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agent. The path was familiar: untrusted dataset content abused a processing worker (file disclosure, then code execution), credential harvest, then multi-cluster lateral movement. Production Elastic Defend behavior rules and Elastic Security detection (SIEM) rules already watch those types of behaviors. This post maps each stage to detections you can enable…

Hugging Face OpenAI US

tg: incident tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Exploring the Hugging Face Breach: mapping AI agent tactics to Elastic Defend

1

You were onto something with “It’s the Climb,” Miley

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. For my fianceé’s 30th birthday, I took her on a weekend trip to Shenandoah National Park – a favorite of ours since we went to a wedding there several years back. We’ve done several incredible hikes over the years, but one in particular had always loomed over my head: Old Rag, a 9.3 mile circuit hike that’s largely considered the most difficult in Virginia. I've always been warned that at the beginning and end, you hate Old Rag.…

zdravotnictví veřejná správa US

tg: rozbor tg: přehled tp: phishing tp: ransomware tp: identita

· Cisco Talos · You were onto something with “It’s the Climb,” Miley

1

3

The Sub-10-Minute Cloud Takeover: How Exposed IAM Keys, Misconfiguration and AI Are Rewriting the Rules of Cloud Breaches

Key Takeaways Two real-world cloud attacks reached meaningful impact in less than ten minutes despite pursuing entirely different objectives. Both attackers treated the environment as a connected system, using existing permissions and relationships to expand their reach. Reconnaissance increasingly focuses on understanding access and capability rather than discovering vulnerable assets. AI is compressing the gap between discovery, decision-making, and execution for cloud attackers. The interval…

Amazon Web Services US

tg: incident tg: rozbor tg: propagace tp: podvod tp: AI tp: identita

· Qualys · The Sub-10-Minute Cloud Takeover: How Exposed IAM Keys, Misconfiguration and AI Are Rewriting the Rules of Cloud Breaches

Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: How we cut AI agent LLM calls by 60%

This is Part 3 of the Inside Elastic InfoSec's Agentic SOC series. Part 1: How we triage every alert before an analyst opens it · Part 2: Choosing the right agent architecture for a 5× cost reduction We run 14 AI agents in the Elastic InfoSec security operations pipeline. They were producing correct verdicts and taking up to 19 large language model (LLM) calls to do work that needed 8, at thousands of input tokens per call. At hundreds of runs per day, that compounds fast. We built a five-step…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: How we cut AI agent LLM calls by 60%

Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: How we cut AI agent LLM calls by 60%

This is Part 3 of the Inside Elastic InfoSec's Agentic SOC series. Part 1: How we triage every alert before an analyst opens it · Part 2: Choosing the right agent architecture for a 5× cost reduction We run 14 AI agents in the Elastic InfoSec security operations pipeline. They were producing correct verdicts and taking up to 19 large language model (LLM) calls to do work that needed 8, at thousands of input tokens per call. At hundreds of runs per day, that compounds fast. We built a five-step…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: How we cut AI agent LLM calls by 60%

3

Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: When to inline your agent's skills for a 5× cost reduction

This is Part 2 of the Inside Elastic InfoSec's Agentic SOC series. Part 1: How we triage every alert before an analyst opens it. Part 3: how we cut AI agent LLM calls by 60%. Investigating a Windows endpoint alert in Elastic InfoSec's production agentic security operations center (SOC) costs $0.69. That's what we pay running an orchestration workflow of specialized Elastic AI agents on the Elastic Inference Service (EIS). Route the same alert to a single agent working through 14 skills, and the…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: When to inline your agent's skills for a 5× cost reduction

Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: When to inline your agent's skills for a 5× cost reduction

This is Part 2 of the Inside Elastic InfoSec's Agentic SOC series. Part 1: How we triage every alert before an analyst opens it. Part 3: how we cut AI agent LLM calls by 60%. Investigating a Windows endpoint alert in Elastic InfoSec's production agentic security operations center (SOC) costs $0.69. That's what we pay running an orchestration workflow of specialized Elastic AI agents on the Elastic Inference Service (EIS). Route the same alert to a single agent working through 14 skills, and the…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · Inside Elastic InfoSec's agentic SOC: When to inline your agent's skills for a 5× cost reduction

3

Chaos ransomware's msaRAT: Living off the browser to build a covert C2 channel

Cisco Talos has discovered a new Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) we call “msaRAT” attributed to the Chaos ransomware group. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary: “msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” and “msaMessage”.msaRAT is implemented using the Tokio asynchronous runtime, with primary capabilities of browser-leveraged remote code execution and covert tunneling to establish command-and-control (C2) communications.This RAT never touches the network directly — it…

US

tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: ransomware

· Cisco Talos · Chaos ransomware's msaRAT: Living off the browser to build a covert C2 channel

How Elasticsearch ES|QL COMPLETION turns noisy curl and wget rules into high-fidelity cloud security alerts

We ran a noisy wget detection rule on Elastic's own cloud fleet for seven days. Three destinations survived deterministic filtering, Elasticsearch Query Language (ES|QL) COMPLETION triaged all three, and none of them created an alert that an analyst had to open. Each rule parses the destination from curl and wget executions, filters known-good hosts, redacts secrets, and then hands whatever’s left to a large language model (LLM) for a triage verdict. File transfer detections stay on in cloud…

Elastic US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tg: propagace tp: AI

· Elastic Security · How Elasticsearch ES|QL COMPLETION turns noisy curl and wget rules into high-fidelity cloud security alerts

1

1

Iran War Cyber Threat Landscape | A Midyear Assessment on What Matters

In April, SentinelLABS’ Tom Hegel published an initial assessment of the first five weeks of the conflict. Three months later, the evidence supports refinement. Executive Summary The cyber risk remains quieter than the public narrative. It rests on persistent access, trusted administration, service-provider pathways, selective disruption, and personas that magnify technical effects. Iran-linked activity is not a single threat set. MOIS, the IRGC Intelligence Organization, the IRGC Cyber…

US

tg: rozbor tp: AI tp: špionáž tp: průmyslové systémy

· SentinelLabs · Iran War Cyber Threat Landscape | A Midyear Assessment on What Matters

2

New North Korean campaign uses fake coding interviews to steal developer credentials

Elastic Security Labs found a new Contagious Interview campaign, tracked as REF9403, hiding malware inside SVG image files using steganography. To our knowledge, this specific infection chain has not been previously documented. We found it after the DPRK-aligned group targeted our own community Slack workspace with a fake job posting and a "coding challenge" project. Any user who ran the project ended up with a four-stage payload aligned with OTTERCOOKIE: a browser credential and crypto wallet…

US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: dodavatelský řetězec tp: špionáž

· Elastic Security · New North Korean campaign uses fake coding interviews to steal developer credentials

New North Korean campaign uses fake coding interviews to steal developer credentials

Elastic Security Labs found a new Contagious Interview campaign, tracked as REF9403, hiding malware inside SVG image files using steganography. To our knowledge, this specific infection chain has not been previously documented. We found it after the DPRK-aligned group targeted our own community Slack workspace with a fake job posting and a "coding challenge" project. Any user who ran the project ended up with a four-stage payload aligned with OTTERCOOKIE: a browser credential and crypto wallet…

US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: identita tp: špionáž

· Elastic Security · New North Korean campaign uses fake coding interviews to steal developer credentials

4

Begun, the Patch Wars have

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. We all knew, to some degree or another, that this summer was going to a hot mess. I don’t mean FIFA drama or record setting heat waves. I mean the slow but steady momentum that AI frontier models were accruing for vulnerability research. If you were like me, and guesstimating exactly when that shoe would drop, my money was on the middle of summer. And... well, friends, I hate to say it, but I was right. This July’s Patch Tuesday is…

Microsoft US

tg: rozbor tg: názor tg: přehled tp: malware tp: AI

· Cisco Talos · Begun, the Patch Wars have

UAT-11795 deploys novel Starland RAT and bespoke WLDR C2 implant in financially motivated campaign

Cisco Talos is disclosing UAT-11795, a sophisticated, Russian-speaking, financially motivated adversary that has been conducting a malicious campaign targeting users in the U.S. and Europe since at least June 2025. Talos has discovered that the actor in this campaign delivers a Python-based remote access tool (RAT) that we track as “Starland RAT” and a command-and-control (C2) memory implant known as the “WLDR agent.” The WLDR agent is a sophisticated PowerShell-based C2 memory implant that…

US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: podvod

· Cisco Talos · UAT-11795 deploys novel Starland RAT and bespoke WLDR C2 implant in financially motivated campaign

TELEPUZ: a modular MaaS malware spreading via CLICKFIX-VIDAR chains

Elastic Security Labs is tracking an emerging threat named TELEPUZ, which we have discovered spreading widely via a CLICKFIX-VIDAR chain. This malware is in active development and has been operating since late April 2026, according to the infrastructure information we collected. The malware is full-featured, lightweight, and modular. While the number of C2 domains is currently small, the daily volume of builds uploaded to VirusTotal and the rapid pace of updates indicate active development and…

US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing

· Elastic Security · TELEPUZ: a modular MaaS malware spreading via CLICKFIX-VIDAR chains

1

The Risk of Exposed Cloud Functions and How to Harden

Written by: Corné de Jong Introduction Mandiant security assessments frequently identify publicly exposed serverless applications that lack authentication, often as a result of specific business requirements. Serverless deployments typically run custom-developed code that incorporates third-party packages, making them targets for a wide range of application-level attacks, including: Local and Remote File Inclusion (LFI/RFI) Command Injection Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities can…

Google US

tg: rozbor tg: návod tp: identita

· Mandiant / Google TI · The Risk of Exposed Cloud Functions and How to Harden

3

AI Security Report 2026

For years, the cyber security industry tracked AI as a force multiplier: something that made existing attack techniques faster, cheaper, and more accessible. That framing was accurate. But the Annual AI Security Report 2026 from Check Point Research documents a transition that goes further. AI has crossed from assistant to operator. Where it once helped attackers prepare, it now runs the operation. Key observed findings AI has crossed from development aid to live attack operator. It now does…

veřejná správa IL

tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: AI tp: špionáž

· Check Point Research · AI Security Report 2026

1

3

ClickFix to Cash-Out: Anatomy of a Mexican Banking-Fraud Toolkit

A Mexican banking fraud operation we're tracking as REF6045 doesn't run on autopilot. A human operator is behind the wheel, monitoring infected machines and deciding what happens next. Victims are infected through fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into running a single command, which installs SCMBANKER, a PowerShell toolkit with components dating back to at least October 2025. Once installed, the operator can see when a victim opens a banking session, lock the screen behind a fake bank warning…

finance telekomunikace US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: podvod

· Elastic Security · ClickFix to Cash-Out: Anatomy of a Mexican Banking-Fraud Toolkit

ClickFix to Cash-Out: Anatomy of a Mexican Banking-Fraud Toolkit

A Mexican banking fraud operation we're tracking as REF6045 doesn't run on autopilot. A human operator is behind the wheel, monitoring infected machines and deciding what happens next. Victims are infected through fake CAPTCHA pages that trick them into running a single command, which installs SCMBANKER, a PowerShell toolkit with components dating back to at least October 2025. Once installed, the operator can see when a victim opens a banking session, lock the screen behind a fake bank warning…

finance telekomunikace US

tg: varování tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: phishing tp: podvod

· Elastic Security · ClickFix to Cash-Out: Anatomy of a Mexican Banking-Fraud Toolkit

1

Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework

Note: SysAid was not compromised, and no SysAid vulnerability was involved. The attacker had already gained access to the victim environment and abused a legitimate software-deployment feature to deploy malware onto another machine within it. Key Points Check Point Research (CPR) tracks ‘Cavern Manticore’ as an Iran-nexus threat actor operating against Israeli targets, with a focus on the government and IT sectors. Cavern Manticore shares technical overlaps with other Iranian MOIS (Ministry of…

veřejná správa IL

tg: rozbor tp: malware tp: špionáž

· Check Point Research · Cavern Manticore: Exposing Iran-Linked Modular C2 Framework